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This paper examines why the Korean economy is most suffering 
from the current U.S. born financial crisis and suggests policies to 
overcome it with discerning the features of the current crisis from 
the past one. A notable feature of the current crisis is that 
excessive securitization by financial institutions and reliance on 
financial derivatives widens and deepens the crisis much further 
and makes it difficult to assess the damages from the crisis. 
Policy suggestions include: The government provide enough liquidity; 
the government first restructure financial institutions and lead 
corporate restructuring together with them; macro financial regula- 
tion and supervision as well as micro one be emphasized; and a 
drastic stimulus package be introduced not only to stimulate the 
economy in recession but also to enlarge the long term growth 
potential. 
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I. Introduction
Over the past few months, we have watched the biggest crisis since 
the Great Depression unfold first in the U.S. and spill over to EU, Asia 
and the world. The housing melted down, the stock market tumbled, 
and a swath of banks went bankrupt and were merged into others. As 
a liquidity crisis threatens to turn into a whole systemic crisis, the 
* Professor, Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul 151- 
746, Korea, (Tel) +82-2-880-6389, (Fax) +82-2-886-4231, (E-mail) kimij@snu.ac. 
kr; Professor, Department of Economics, Sookmyung University, Hyochangwon- 
gil 52, Yongsan-ku, Seoul 140-742, Korea, (Tel) +82-2-710-9530, (Fax) +82-2- 
2077-7328, (E-mail) ysrhee@sookmyung.ac.kr, respectively.
[Seoul Journal of Economics 2009, Vol. 22, No. 2]
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS146
governments have heavily intervened to prevent the crisis from further 
spreading. Even the U.S. government has used direct involvement in 
financial markets at the most extraordinary level since the Great 
Depression. But the sub-prime mortgage market crisis has evolved into 
a financial crisis, a credit crisis, and a confidence crisis, and also 
affected the real sector. 
Korea is no exception to the global financial crisis. At the beginning, 
only the foreign exchange market was fluctuated due to temporary lack 
of the U.S. dollar. But within a few weeks the whole financial system 
was frozen, and within a few months the whole economy fell into a big 
trouble. At the end of 2007 the Korea Composite Stock Price Index 
(KOSPI) was around 1900 and the won-dollar exchange rate was 
around 930. However, at the end of 2008 after one year, the KOSPI 
plunged to the level of 1100s while the exchange rate was over 1300, 
surpassing the KOSPI. What’s worse is that the volatility in the foreign 
exchange market and the stock market during the crisis unfolding was 
the highest in the world. Korea became one of the most suffering 
countries from the U.S. born financial crisis. 
Before the crisis, overall macroeconomic trend had been stable, 
government or external deficit was not the case, financial soundness of 
firms and financial institutions had improved, and foreign reserve was 
well over $200 billion. This raises a question why Korea is suffering 
the most in spite that its economy was in relatively good shape 
compared not only to other countries but also to the past stricken by 
the Asian crisis in 1997. In the paper, we assess what has been wrong 
in the Korean economy to provide reasonable answers to the above 
question. 
We also try to discern features of the current crisis from the past 
one. This crisis may look familiar and call to mind the unhappy 
precedent that took place in Asia in 1997. Underlying causes of the 
crisis such as housing bubble, greedy bankers, a flood of liquidity, 
excess leverage, lax regulation, moral hazard, and a toxic relationship 
between government and business are very similar to “Asian sins” that 
were decried a decade ago. But these similarities may hide important 
differences. For example, most countries consider the current one 
different from the past one, and emphasize that the role of the state in 
the financial sector should increase, which is quite opposite to the long 
trend of liberalization. This suggests that without clear understanding 
features of the current crisis, we may be led to undesirable remedies. 
Thus, we aim to identify main features of the current global crisis and 
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suggest necessary policies using the analysis of the current features 
and past remedies. 
The remaining of the paper is composed as follows. Section II 
presents how the global financial crisis started in the U.S. and how the 
U.S. government has responded to mitigate the crisis. Section III 
examines the causes and the effects of the crisis on the Korean 
economy, focusing on six most imminent issues. Section IV analyzes 
past remedies and suggest policies needed to cope with the ongoing 
crisis and to prepare a new revival after the crisis. Finally, Section V 
concludes with a brief summary. 
II. Global Financial Crisis
A. How the Crisis Started in the U.S.
The global financial crisis started in the U.S. due to many complex 
causes. One of underlying causes is the low interest rate policy by the 
Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) after the Dotcom Bubble to bolster the 
economy. This expansionary policy encouraged U.S. households to 
purchase homes with excessive loans without saving and played a 
critical role in creating bubbles in the real estate market and the stock 
market. 
Meanwhile the U.S. accumulated foreign debt because of a tremendous 
current account deficit caused by binge of households and the govern- 
ment sector. The current account deficit was offset by the inflow of 
foreign capital, i.e., the surplus of the capital account. In this process, 
the foreign demand for U.S. securities provided money for U.S. 
consumption beyond its capacity. 
The bubble in the real estate market whose growth rate exceeded 
that of income growth rate persisted along with self-fulfilling expectation 
that the prices would continue to rise.1 Mortgage lending institutions 
deducted down-payments and offered low floating interest rates for the 
first 2 to 3 years in order to increase loans. 
Before 2000 sub-prime mortgage loans rarely took place. But with 
continuous increase of house prices, the loans had expanded to those 
with sub-prime credit rating, accelerating the creation of bubble in the 
housing market. 
1 Shibata (2004) points out that the bubble in the asset market preceded the 
U.S. Great Depression in the 1930s and the Japan's Lost Decade in the 1990s. 
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Sub-prime mortgage loans substantially increased as new financial 
products through securitization2 of mortgages sprang up. The first 
securitization of mortgages was done by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
after the 1970s. In order to increase marketability, these institutions 
provided payment protection for mortgage-backed securities (MBS). 
They first guaranteed only prime mortgage loans but gradually expanded 
the guarantee to lower grade loans including sub-prime mortgage 
loans.
The securitization of loans became popular as sub-prime mortgage 
loans were packaged as collateralized debt obligation (CDO). Investment 
banks were the forerunners of this process. During the process, credit 
rating agencies’ assessment or mono-line insurers’ guarantees were 
used to increase credit rating and consequently bonds were issued at a 
relatively low interest rate. Credit rating agencies assessed credit of 
bond issuers after receiving fees from them. The mono-line insurers 
received premiums and in return promised payment protection. 
Moreover, insurance companies and investment banks sold credit 
default swap (CDS)3 similar to guarantees by mono-line insurers. Yet 
those institutions could not compensate losses in case of a crisis 
because thousands of billion dollars were traded in the CDS market 
whereas those institutions lacked such amount of capital. 
As institutional investors’ money flowed in to the MBS and CDO 
markets, those who had not been able to acquire loans due to low 
credit were able to borrow money. This easier access to loans resulted 
in increased demand for housing and dramatic increase in house 
prices. 
The financial derivatives spread further because of low interest 
monetary policy and lack of financial oversight. Financial institutions 
borrowed money at a low interest rate and increased their purchase of 
MBS or CDO related to mortgages. They especially established a struc- 
tured investment vehicle (SIV) and recorded those transactions as off- 
balance sheet transactions which are not under restriction or oversight 
by financial authorities. Some financial institutions too much relied on 
short-term collateralized borrowing and had to pay more than a quarter 
2
The securitization of mortgage loans means creating securities guaranteed 
by a package containing mortgage loans. In this case the investors may be 
compensated with the principal and interest rates paid by mortgage borrowers. 
3
An off-board financial derivative which trades the default risk. A company 
promises to compensate for the losses if the bond holder fails to receive the 
principal and the interests from the bond issuer.
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of their liabilities every day. 
Such rollovers of short-term borrowing did not pose any problems 
when house prices were rising and capital at low interest-rate was 
abundant. However, as the bubble burst in the real estate market and 
the interest rate rose due to the restrictionary monetary policy, lenders 
started to refuse rollovers for those institutions. Thus, financial 
institutions with high leverage quickly sold their assets, which led to 
plunging asset prices and exacerbated insolvency. 
A question is how securitization of loans was possible without 
accurate assessment of risk, ultimately resulting in a financial crisis. 
In other words, how could the first mortgage loan companies, MBS 
issuers, CDO issuers, mono-line insurers, credit rating agencies, and 
CDS sellers believe the results of computer risk model without due 
diligence and finally cause the financial crisis?
Some people assert that the securitization process itself precludes 
due diligence: that since companies believe the asset risks can be 
transferred to others by securitization, they lack the incentive to ac- 
curately assess the risks. However, this assertion is not persuasive, 
because even if a structured investment vehicle is established to record 
the transactions as off-balance sheet transactions during securitization, 
relevant institutions would know that in case of insolvency those 
transactions must be recorded in the balance sheet.
A more reasonable answer is the greed of the Wall Street and the 
lack of due regulation and supervision.4 The Wall Street was enticed by 
high rate of return of mortgage related assets and used derivatives to 
excessively expand mortgage related transactions. However, the then- 
FRB chairman Alan Greenspan opposed measures against the Wall 
Street, asserting that derivatives disperse risk according to risk-managing 
capacity. 
They did not sense the underlying risk of securitization. As the 
systemic risk of the financial market was underestimated, the leverage 
of financial institutions rose excessively.5 This excessive reliance on 
liabilities ignited the global financial crisis when the FRB turned to 
restrictionary policy and liquidity dried up after the bubble burst in the 
real estate market. Also, excessive securitization by financial institutions 
and reliance on financial derivatives made it difficult to assess the 
4
Among others, visit homepages of Krugman and Stiglitz. 
5 Shiller (2005) explains why excessive behavior often arises in the assets 
market such as the stock market and the real estate market. 
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damages from the sub-prime mortgage crisis. They contributed to 
spreading the sub-prime mortgage crisis to the whole financial in- 
dustry.
The American financial crisis has evolved into a liquidity crisis, a 
credit crisis, and a confidence crisis and also infected the real sector. 
Because of credit crunch, firms are reluctant to carry out investment. 
This lack of investment along with the falls in stock and house prices 
have led to a decrease in consumption and a recession. Unemployment 
has reached the highest rate and the manufacturing index has fallen 
by the greatest range since the Great Depression. 
The financial crisis of the U.S. has also affected Europe and emerg- 
ing economies and instability of the financial markets and recession is 
worsening. Due to the global nature of financial transactions a 
financial crisis is looming in Europe where financial products linked to 
the U.S. subprime mortgage were widely traded. The bubble burst in 
the real estate market rapidly spread and the fall of stock prices 
matches that of the U.S. 
American financial crisis has had a great impact on emerging 
economies as well. The decrease in exports due to a global recession 
and the outflow of capital from small emerging markets have hit those 
countries hard. Countries exporting natural resources are suffering 
because of the fall in raw material prices. 
B. U.S. Policies in Response6
Professor Blinder of the Princeton University believes that the 
financial crisis would not have spread widely if the following six policy 
failures had been properly addressed. First, he believes that regulation 
and supervision of financial derivatives were absent despite the 
warning of Chairman Born of Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
Second, Blinder believes that letting investment banks’ leverages exceed 
30 was a mistake. Before 2004, the leverage of those institutions did 
not exceed 12. Third, he criticizes leaving intact the huge growth of 
sub-prime mortgage loans despite its danger. Fourth, the government 
did not respond timely to the fall of house prices and the increase in 
foreclosures when the bubble burst in the real estate market. Fifth, the 
government left Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt. Although such a 
policy helps prevent moral hazard of financial institutions, saving Bear 
6 For various responses of the U.S. government, see Acharya and Richardson 
(2009). 
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Sterns which ranked 5th in terms of asset value through an M&A while 
leaving Lehman Brothers to fail, whose effect on the economy is 
greater, was an inconsistent policy response. The government failed to 
properly assess the impact of the policy. Last but not least, the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was used for recapitalization 
rather than disposal of troubled assets. Blinder believes that the 
government should have purchased troubled assets to decrease fore- 
closures. 
As the crisis spreads, the U.S. is responding to the crisis by 
providing liquidity and enforcing financial restructuring to recover 
confidence at the same time. The financial restructuring is being done 
through the government’s credit guarantee and loans. The government 
is aiding the M&A of insolvent financial institutions.
The Treasury and the FRB have led the M&A of financial institutions. 
They have also initiated recapitalization and disposal of non-performing 
assets through bailout. However, the authorities are neither injecting 
money to purchase common stocks nor establishing bad banks. 
Nationalization of banks through government investment, which is 
disputable, has not taken place.
On December 16, 2008, the FRB cut the federal funds rate to 0.25% 
and is extending loans to firms and households. This policy may reflect 
the FRB’s intent that it may increase money supply indefinitely if 
necessary. However, the monetary policy through interest rate changes 
has become futile. The FRB also cut the discount rates several times to 
0.5% and opened the rediscount market to investments suffering from 
a credit crunch. In addition, it has purchased CP or bank bonds to 
provide liquidity directly to those financial institutions or firms and 
remove credit crunch. 
The present financial crisis can be solved only if the credit crunch 
and the confidence crisis are solved together. The government must 
purchase non-performing loans and inject money to increase capital. It 
should consider all the possible policies including nationalization. In 
case of nationalization, if a financial institution’s value increases 
though restructuring, the government may collect more money than 
what it initially invested. For example, in the 1990s, the Swedish 
government nationalized, restructured and resold shares to earn more 
than it invested. 
During the financial crisis in 1997, unlike the U.S., the Korean 
government led the restructuring of financial and corporate sectors at 
the same time according to the IMF’s prescription. The Korea Asset 
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Management Corporation (KAMCO) served as the bad bank and 
disposed of non-performing assets. Some insolvent banks merged with 
healthy banks, and some were nationalized. Disposal of non-performing 
assets was financed by the KAMCO’s bonds guaranteed by the 
government. Recapitalization, contribution, and deposit payoff were 
financed by Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC)’s bonds. 
The Obama Administration plans to strengthen federal regulations 
overseeing the financial markets and financial products, especially 
hedge funds, credit rating agencies, and mortgage brokers. The admin- 
istration intends to comprehensively regulate financial institutions and 
products by a more integrated regulatory institution. It is particularly 
concerned about preventing the conflict of interests formed between 
credit rating agencies and financial institutions when the former 
receives fees for evaluating products of the latter.
To prevent the greed of insolvent institutions’ CEOs and moral 
hazard, new examination of executive compensation is necessary. 
Excessive executive compensation for the management with improper 
incentives to raise the short-term earnings has played a critical role in 
aggravating the financial crisis. Accurate assessment of the manage- 
ment’s performance and restriction on compensation will be important, 
especially for the management of financial institutions which have 
applied for bailout. 
Also important is the role of the central bank. To prevent the 
insolvency of some institutions from degenerating into a system-wide 
crisis, the regulatory function of the central bank must be strength- 
ened.
In addition, the Obama administration submitted a stimulus package 
of 825 billion dollars to the Congress. Since the economy is already in 
the liquidity trap, there is a limit to stimulating the economy by the 
monetary policy, a dramatic fiscal policy was called for. This economic 
stimulus package exceeds 5% of the U.S. GDP of 14 trillion dollars. 
The stimulus package is largely composed of increased government 
spending and tax reduction. However, when the real sector is fast going 
downhill, increased government spending is more effective in stimu- 
lating the economy than tax reduction. For despite tax reduction 
consumers may favor saving over consumption because of future 
uncertainty. Obama plans to spend 1/3 of the package on tax reduc- 
tion and 2/3 on increased government spending. The administration 
intends to increase spending on education, health care, developing 
alternative energies, computerization, and building SOC such as roads 
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and harbors.
Of course, the short-term goal of financial and fiscal policies is to 
boost the economy and consumer confidence. However, one of America’s 
long-term policy goals is to reduce balance of payments deficit and 
resolve global imbalances. This long-term goal is incompatible with the 
short-term goal of stimulating the economy. The U.S. has a new 
agenda to reconcile those two goals.
III. The Shaking Korean Economy
In this part we plan to assess the causes and the effects of the crisis 
on the Korean economy, focusing on six most imminent issues: 
whether Korean financial institutions are healthy, why short-term 
foreign bonds increased, why the balance of payment has gotten worse 
and the exchange rate soared, how the falling stock prices in Korea 
and U.S. stock markets are synchrnized, what are problems in the real 
estate market and finally how the global recession affects Korean 
exports. 
A. Health of Korean Financial Institutions
Many financial institutions have had internal problems. Unless those 
problems are solved, it will be difficult to overcome the current crisis. 
The most serious internal problems is vulnerability of financing and 
investment structure to market fluctuation. 
According to the Bank of Korea’s statistics, the growth rate of loans 
substantially exceeded that of deposits. As the result, the loan-deposit 
ratio which had been under 100% rose to 135% in 2007. 
The data provided by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) reveals 
that at the end of November 2008, the total financing of financial 
institutions was 1,131 trillion won, of which 718 trillion won was 
deposits and 413 trillion won was marketable receivables such as 
negotiable certificates of deposit and bank bonds. This shows 36.5% of 
financing depends on instruments which are sensitive to financial 
market conditions. On the asset side of 1,170 trillion won, loans 
accounted for 929 trillion won, of which 424 trillion won went to small 
and medium enterprises, and securities amounted to 250 trillion won. 
Thus, a large part of the asset (424 trillion won plus 250 trillion) is 
also very vulnerable to market fluctuation. 
Moreover, in the last three years, financial institutions’ foreign debt 
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increased rapidly. This increase of the debt and the escalation of the 
exchange rate will hamper the soundness of banks. Also, the foreign 
currency financing cost expressed in won rose and rolling over of 
short-term foreign debt became difficult as the exchange rate as well as 
the interest rate increased. 
Those internal problems and the spread of global financial crisis to 
the real sector would result in minus economic growth in Korea. When 
insolvency is exacerbated because of recession, some of financial 
institutions will end up with non-performing assets. At the same time, 
exports have decreased since the 4
th quarter of 2008, already calling 
for restructuring of the construction, ship building, and the automobile 
industries. If this phenomenon spreads to other sectors, it could lead 
to banks’ insolvency.
Reflecting recession, 18 Korean banks’ net profit decreased by 47.4% 
in 2008 compared to that of 2007. The loan loss reserve was 9.9 
trillion won, which is more than twice the amount of the previous year, 
4.5 trillion won. In the 4
th quarter of 2008, banks recorded net loss of 
0.3 trillion won. As the economy’s downward spiral is fast and wide, 
the loan loss reserve may not be able to compensate for future in- 
solvency. 
Also worrying is the possibility of financial institutions’ insolvency 
when the bubble in the real estate market bursts. In that case, the 
insolvency will be accelerated, driving the economy into a deeper 
recession. As the real estate market crashes, the consequent reduction 
in consumption would also worsen the domestic economy.
The degree of financial institutions’ insolvency depends on the speed 
of the recession and that of the real estate market’s downward spiral. 
The government’s and the banks’ preemptive measures will be neces- 
sary to recapitalize banks’ assets and to dispose of non-performing 
assets. 
B. Increase of Short-Term Foreign Debt
One of the reasons why the exchange rate soared and periodic 
rumors of another foreign exchange crisis spread is the sharp increase 
in foreign debt. Other capital account, which shows the amount of 
banks’ loans, increased from 6.8 billion dollars in 2005 to 48.3 billion 
dollars in 2006 and to 43.9 billion dollars in 2007. When a global 
crisis hit the markets in 2008, there was deficit of 10.6 billion dollar in 
other capital account. Acquiring foreign exchange was so hard, and the 
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Source: Bank of Korea
FIGURE 1
TOTAL AND SHORT TERM FOREIGN DEBT
exchange rate soared accordingly. As capital also flew out in the stock 
market, the amount of foreign capital changing direction from inflow to 
outflow amounted to 54.5 billion dollars. 
This sequence of events also happened during the 1997 foreign 
exchange crisis.7 11 billion dollar of surplus in other capital account in 
1996 changed to 10.7 billion dollar of deficit in 1997. The size of the 
foreign reserve was not enough to cope with the foreign capital flight of 
over 20 billion dollars, and the exchange rate skyrocketed. 
Figure 1 shows the changes in total and short-term foreign debt. 
Their growth rates were minimal until the end of 2005. However, 
during 2006 and 2007, the total foreign debt rose sharply by 
approximately 195 billion dollars from 187.8 billion dollars to 382.1 
billion dollars. Short-term foreign debt also increased by 95 billion 
dollars from 65.9 billion dollars to 160.2 billion dollars.
Behind those sharp increases is the underestimation of the cost of 
financing foreign capital. Banks believed that the won would appreciate 
further given the higher domestic interest rate compared to foreign 
interest rates. However, this ignored the possibility that the exchange 
7
For more detailed explanation, refer to Kim and Rhee (1998). 
($million)
Foreign debt (A)
Short-term foreign debt (B)
A/B
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TABLE 1
WON-DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE FLUCTUATIONS
Unit: % 






2002 10.6 17.9 10.8 0.0 3.0 10.7
2003 11.0 19.9 10.8 0.0 4.7 -0.5
2004 4.6 7.7 7.5 0.0 3.9 15.2
2005 -13.0 -12.7 -10.3 2.6 10.5 2.3
2006 -0.8 11.5 13.9 3.3 6.7 8.8
2007 5.3 10.2 1.7 6.4 2.7 -0.9
2008 19.4 -3.5 -27.6 6.4 -18.6 -34.0
2002-2008 31.5 59.7 -0.3 17.4 11.8 4.3
Note: Calculated based on end basis
Source: Bank of Korea
rate as well as the actual cost of financing foreign capital may soar in 
case foreign capital escapes during the boom-bust cycle. Table 1 shows 
how the won appreciated until 2007 but depreciated sharply in 2008. 
The sudden surge in the size of the foreign debt is also similar to 
what happened in the 1997 foreign exchange crisis. Korea seems to 
have forgotten what we experienced back then: When the size of 
short-term foreign debt increases sharply, even a small external shock 
can cause short-term capital flight and huge exchange rate fluctuation. 
The financial authorities as well as the banks are responsible for the 
sharp increase in foreign debt. Until the end of 2007, Korea had been 
a net creditor and was believed to be immune from foreign exchange 
crises or exchange rate fluctuations due to substantial foreign 
exchange reserve. However, the authorities neglected one thing. Even at 
the end of 2007, the amount of foreigners’ net domestic investment 
was greater than Korean’s overseas investment by 229.5 billion dollars. 
Foreigners’ investment in the stock market is not recorded as Korea’s 
foreign debt. However, as in this global financial crisis, when capital 
rapidly flows away from the Korean market to overseas, the stock 
market and the foreign exchange market become volatile. Stock prices 
will plunge and the exchange rate will skyrocket. 
In short, neglecting to oversee the flow of foreign capital and to meet 
GLOBAL CRISIS AND KOREAN ECONOMY 157
TABLE 2


























1995 -8,665 16,785 -1,776 11,712 7,458 -121 -7,044 32,712
1996 -23,120 23,326 -2,344 15,101 11,084 82 -1,388 33,236
1997 -8,287 1,314 -1,605 14,384 -10,768 -88 11,921 20,405
1998 40,371 -3,196 672 -1,224 -2,162 -654 -30,975 52,040
1999 24,521 2,040 5,135 9,189 -11,382 -513 -22,982 74,054
2000 12,250 12,110 4,284 12,176 -3,556 -179 -23,771 96,198
2001 8,032 -3,390 1,107 6,706 -10,350 -122 -7,575 102,821
2002 5,393 6,251 -224 346 6,853 362 -11,799 121,412
2003 11,949 13,909 100 17,287 -2,698 619 -25,849 155,352
2004 28,173 7,598 4,588 6,599 -3,856 2,020 -38,710 199,066
2005 14,980 4,756 2,010 -3,518 6,814 1,789 -19,805 210,390
2006 5,385 17,972 -4,540 -23,230 48,384 484 -22,112 238,956
2007 5,876 7,128 -13,836 -26,058 43,965 5,445 -15,218 262,224
2008 -6,406 -50,933 -10,595 -15,368 -10,600 -14,333 56,446 201,223
Source: Bank of Korea
maturity structures is a key reason behind the current crisis. 
C. Exchange Rate Soaring
The worsening balance of payments additionally contributed to the 
depreciation of the Korean won. In 2007 both current account and 
capital account were in surplus of 5.94 billion dollar and 6.23 billion 
dollar respectively. However, in 2008 both were in deficit of 6.41 billion 
dollar and 5.65 billion dollar respectively, pressuring the currency to 
depreciate. In case of current account, the services account and the 
transfer account’s deficit decreased and the surplus in income account 
increased. However, as the goods account decreased drastically, the 
current account was in deficit.
The capital account is the sum of investment account and other 
capital account. Table 2 shows the movement of investment account 
since 1995. The investment account is composed of direct investment 
account, portfolio investment account, financial derivatives account and 
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other investments account. Other investment account shows the move- 
ment of capital through financial institutions, which is mostly traded 
in dollars and the interest rate is calculated by adding spread to 
LIBOR or U.S. treasury bonds’ yield. Financial derivative account usually 
records any losses occurred during financial derivatives transactions.
Table 3 and Table 4 show that in 2006 Koreans’ stock investment 
and debt investment in overseas markets increased by 15.2 and 16.0 
billion dollars respectively. On the other hand, foreigners brought 16.4 
billion dollars into the Korean bond market whereas they pulled out 
8.3 billion dollars from the stock market. As a result, net capital 
investment by foreigners was 8.1 billion dollars and portfolio invest- 
ment account was in deficit of 23.2 billion dollars. However, other 
capital investment recorded a surplus of 48.3 billion dollars, resulting 
in a surplus of 17.9 dollars in capital account and contributing to the 
appreciation of won. 
The capital account also recorded a surplus of 7.1 billion dollars in 
2007. However, net foreign investment by Koreans amounted to 56.4 
billion dollars. Meanwhile foreigners sold shares in the Korean stock 
market and transferred 28.7 billion dollars overseas yet invested 59.1 
billion dollars in the Korean bond market. Thus, net capital inflow by 
foreigners reached 30.3 billion dollars and reduced the portfolio invest- 
ment account deficit to 26.1 billion dollars. In 2007, other investment 
account was in surplus of 43.9 billion dollars and the capital account 
recorded 7.1 billion dollar surplus. 
In 2008 foreigners transferred 41.2 billion dollars from the Korean 
stock market, and the portfolio investment account deficit was 15.3 
billion dollars despite Koreans’ collection of overseas funds. Also, the 
other investments account surplus of more than 40 billion dollars in 
2006 and 2007 switched to deficit of 10.6 billion dollar, resulting in 
capital account deficit of 50.9 billion dollars. 
A notable feature of the capital account in 2008 is that foreigners’ 
investment in Korean bonds disappeared and they extracted even more 
money from the stock market. This reflects a low possibility of positive 
returns on bond investments due to exchange rate fluctuations and the 
need to recall funds due to global financial instability. 
Another interesting feature is that the financial derivative account, 
which began to be recorded separately in 2008, shows huge deficit of 
14.3 billion dollars. This deficit means losses from financial derivative 
transactions. If the exchange rate at maturity is much higher than 
what was expected at the time of forward trading, one incurs losses 
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1995 11,712 -2,907 -238 -2,669 14,619 4,219 10,400
1996 15,102 -6,413 -653 -5,760 21,514 5,954 15,561
1997 14,384 1,076 -320 1,395 13,308 2,525 10,783
1998 -1,224 -1,999 42 -2,041 775 3,856 -3,081
1999 9,190 1,282 -271 1,553 7,908 12,072 -4,164
2000 12,177 -520 -480 -40 12,697 13,094 -397
2001 6,706 -5,521 -492 -5,029 12,227 10,266 1,962
2002 346 -5,032 -1,460 -3,571 5,378 395 4,983
2003 17,287 -5,403 -1,993 -3,410 22,690 14,419 8,272
2004 6,599 -11,776 -3,622 -8,154 18,375 9,469 8,906
2005 -3,518 -17,632 -3,686 -13,946 14,114 3,282 10,831
2006 -23,230 -31,286 -15,262 -16,024 8,056 -8,391 16,447
2007 -26,058 -56,436 -52,550 -3,886 30,378 -28,728 59,106
2008 -15,368 23,089 6,356 16,733 -38,456 -41,247 2,791
Source: Bank of Korea
when selling forward. In the latter half of 2008, the exchange rate 
increased far greater than expected, resulting in such losses. After the 
global financial crisis, the won depreciated substantially unlike the yen 
or the yuan. 
Also, losses from financial derivative contracts such as KIKO 
(Knock-In Knock-Out) contributed to the financial derivative account 
deficit in 2008.8 Financial institutions sold KIKO to firms which want 
to hedge the exchange rate risk, but such hedging is possible only if 
the exchange rate at a relatively stable level. When the rate deviates 
from a certain level, firms which purchased KIKO could incur huge 
losses. The KIKO structure shows firms are not purchasing insurance 
derivatives but selling them to financial institutions.
A moral hazard problem may arise if financial institutions devising 
KIKO calculated the option price, the exercise price, the ceiling and the 
floor based on past data, while they believe that there is a high 
8 Suh and Khil (2009) shows in detail the structure of KIKO and analyzes the risk 
incurred to the KIKO holders. 
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likelihood of the exchange rate rising. If they expect capital to flow 
overseas from the Korean capital market and other investment account 
surplus to substantially decrease, it is easily expected the exchange 
rate in 2008 to rise compared to the previous year.
In addition, the structure of KIKO which effectively makes exporting 
firms instead of financial institutions to be the sellers of risk is 
problematic. In other words, the structure that KIKO buyers should be 
responsible for big changes in the exchange rate, which is tantamount 
to selling insurance, is problematic. The financial authorities should 
have recognized this problem.
There was foreign capital drain and current account deficit in 2008 
and short-term foreign debt amounted to 190 billion dollars at the end 
of 3
rd quarter the same year. Thus keeping the exchange rate stable 
and securing an adequate amount of foreign exchange was an imminent 
policy issue in spite that Korea’s foreign exchange reserve was well 
over 200 billion dollars. 
The won had gained against the dollar from 2002 to 2007. However, 
the trend was reversed in 2008 and the won depreciated substantially 
against the dollar. In 2008, the exchange rate rose until the end of 
August yet remained relatively stable. But, as the U.S. financial crisis 
worsened in September, the exchange rate rose sharply to 1500s. The 
volatility was also aggravated. The exchange rate remained ever unstable 
due to the government’s inconsistent intervention in the foreign ex- 
change market. 
Fortunately, as 30 billion dollars was secured by the Korea-U.S. 
currency swap, the international concerns of another foreign exchange 
crisis in Korea were dispelled. As a result, the spread of 5 year foreign 
exchange stabilization bond and the CDS premium dropped sharply. 
In October and November, the current account recorded surplus, 
which was expected to stabilize the exchange rate. However, during 
those two months, the exchange rate fluctuated as the capital flowed 
overseas. The government intentionally held the exchange rate at 1,259 
won per dollar through foreign exchange market intervention, since all 
foreign exchange-related assets are evaluated on the basis of December 
30
th’s market average exchange rate. When the offshore NDF market 
closed, the exchange rate was 1,338 won per dollar, suggesting that 
government intervention was so heavy. 
There has been debate over the adequate amount of foreign ex- 
change reserve,9 but there is no right answer to that question. The IMF 
views that the foreign exchange reserve should be enough to offset the 
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current account deficit and short-term foreign debt. Some scholars 
assert that the foreign exchange reserve should additionally cover 
about a quarter of foreign capital in the Korean stock market. They 
believe that such capital will be drained in case of a financial crisis 
but the amount will not exceed a quarter because of losses from falling 
stock prices and rising exchange rate associated with withdrawing 
capital. In this global financial crisis, 41.2 billion dollars of foreign 
capital, which is almost a quarter of total investment funds, evacuated 
the Korean stock market. When discussing the adequate amount of 
foreign exchange reserve, it is important to consider maturity and the 
amounts of Korea’s net overseas investment and net foreign credit. 
D. Synchronization of Korea and U.S. Stock Prices
Figure 2 shows the trend of the KOSPI related to foreign investors’ 
stock trading. Foreign investors’ net sales started in 2007 but did not 
lead to the fall of KOSPI until the latter half of 2007. However, when 
the net sales of foreign investors became widespread in the 2
nd quarter 
of 2008, it contributed to the fall in stock prices. 
Figure 3 shows foreign investors’ share in the stock market. In 
October 2007, the size of market capitalization was 1,029 trillion won, 
of which 333 trillion won or 32.4% belonged to foreign investors. 
However, as stock prices plummeted, the total size fell to 576 trillion 
won by the end of 2008 and so did that owned by foreigners to 167 
trillion won. Also, because of net sales by foreign investors, the 
foreigners’ share decreased to 28.9%.
The global financial crisis crashed down the stock markets not only 
in developed countries but also in Korea. Table 5 shows how stock 
prices changed in Korea, Japan and the U.S. between 2007 and 2008. 
During one year the KOSPI fell by 40.7% to 1,124, and the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) and the Nikkei Index fell by 35.1% and 
42.1%, respectively: the DJIA fell by the lowest rate, and the KOSPI 
and the Nikkei fell by comparable rates. However, the drop rates 
calculated in dollar terms differ. The KOSPI, the DJIA, and the Nikkei 
fell by 56.5%, 35.1%, and 27.4%, respectively with Japan and U.S. 
showing much smaller drop rates. Korea’s drop rate was the greatest 
due to the depreciation of won. 
The common factor effect of the crisis may refute the argument of 
9
See Aizenman et al. (2004) and Rhee and Yoon (2005) among others. 
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Source: Bank of Korea
FIGURE 2
DAILY TREND OF KOSPI AND FOREIGNERS' NET PURCHASE
Source: Financial Supervisory Service
FIGURE 3
FOREIGNERS' SHARE IN THE STOCK MARKET
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TABLE 5
INDEX DROP RATES IN KOREA, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.
DJIA
KOSPI NIKKEI
Local $ terms Local $ terms
2007-12-28 13366 1897 2.0206 15308 134.5148
2008-12-30 8668 1124 0.8772 8859 97.642




STOCK INDEX TRENDS: KOREA AND THE U.S.
decoupling between the U.S. economy and the Asian economy. For 
example, Figure 4 shows the trend of Korea and U.S. stock indices. 
Stock indices are known to usually follow a random walk, but the 
figure shows that the two indices are increasingly being synchronized, 
in particular during the current crisis.10 
A more thorough analysis using econometric techniques also proves 
that after the global financial crisis occurred, the stock markets in 
Korea and the U.S. manifested a stronger coupling of the indices and 
10 Chai and Rhee (2006) also show that U.S. and Asian stock market indices were 
more synchronized during the crisis period than the non-crisis period. 
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that the U.S. market affected the Korean market, but not vice versa. 
This coupling since the global financial crisis, with the U.S. stock price 
affecting that of Korea, implies that without the resolution of the global 
crisis, it may not be easy to recover stock prices only through internal 
measures. 
E. Problems in the Real Estate Market
Japan experienced “The Lost Decade” after the bubble burst in the 
real estate market. The U.S. born financial crisis also started because 
the bubble burst in the real estate market. In the past several years, 
the bubble in the real estate market was common all over the world. In 
many countries, the house prices has fallen by two digits after the 
crisis. 
This bubble in the real estate market was also formed in Korea in 
the last few years because of monetary expansion. If real estate prices 
plunged, household consumption would also plummet by the same rate 
and such a hard landing due to the bubble’s burst would have a 
tremendous impact on the Korean economy. 
Korea’s financial institutions contended that no sub-prime mortgage 
crisis would occur in Korea because compared to foreign counterparts, 
they had less real estate loans and lower loan to value (LTV) ratio and 
debt service ratio (DSR).11 
As they argued, the banks’ LTV decreased from 57.8% in 2004 to 
around 40% in 2008. It may suggest that the banks’ losses due to 
plunge of house prices may be limited. But if other financial institutions’ 
secondary collateral mortgages are included, the figure will rise sub- 
stantially. 
Also, the DSR of households’ residential loans increased from 15.3% 
in December 2005 to 20.2% in December 2007 because of the increase 
in lending rate linked to the market rate. Therefore, households with 
low income levels and excessive loans may experience difficulties. 
What’s more, since the majority of banks’ loans depend on the value of 
real estate collateral, the plunge in real estate prices is likely to lead to 
the financial institutions’ insolvency. 
Figure 5 shows that the real estate prices in Korea rose alarmingly 
since 2001, suggesting a bubble in the market. The price of 
apartments in the “Bubble 7”12 area rose by 30-40% in 2006 alone. 
11
For example, see FSC (2009).
12
Bubble 7 areas includes Gangnam, Seocho, Songpa, Mokdong, Bundang, 
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Source: Kookmin Bank
FIGURE 5
TREND OF MONTHLY HOUSING PRICES
With the global financial crisis and the recession deepening, the 
surge in house prices may switch to a crash. This is already taking 
place in some areas including the “Bubble 7” area. The rise in unsold 
apartment number is also threatening the real estate market. The 
number of unsold apartments rose from 25,000 in 2002 to 160,000 at 
the end of 2008. Such a rise suggests a possibility of construction 
companies’ bankruptcies and may cause additional falls in house prices.
Since the stability of the financial system is directly linked to real 
estate prices, it is imperative that monetary policies reflect real estate 
price changes. The price level in Korea had been stable due to imports 
of low-price manufacturing goods from China and India despite the 
government’s expansionary monetary policies. However, the increased 
liquidity ultimately created a bubble in the real estate market and, 
when it burst, impaired the stability of the financial system and 
brought recession. Thus, the movement of real estate prices must be 
somehow reflected in conducting monetary policies. 
Yongin, and Pyunchon where real estate prices were rising faster than other areas. 
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This requires that there must be data about the real estate market 
and trades thereof. The lack of data has discouraged for the monetary 
authorities to reflect such movements in the monetary policies. The 
Bank of Korea or the government think-tanks must accumulate relevant 
databases. 
F. Effects of Global Recession on Korean Exports
When exports rapidly decreased in November 2008, the Korean 
government substantially lowered the forecasted growth rate of 2009. 
This correction is due to the large role exports play in the Korean 
economy and to the uncertainty of how much exports will change in 
light of a global recession. 
During the previous crisis, Korea recorded a surplus of more than 40 
billion dollars in 1998. The combination of export increase due to the 
global boom and import decrease due to the recession in Korea con- 
tributed to the surplus. But 50% increase in the exchange rate (from 
900 won per dollar to 1,350 won per dollar) contributed most to the 
surplus.
In 2008, despite the increasing exchange rate, the export growth rate 
was only 4.6%. Particularly worrying was the export growth rate of 
-11.9% in the 4
th quarter, compared to the previous period despite 40% 
increase in the exchange rate (from 936 won per dollar at the end of 
2007 to 1,300 won per dollar). While price competitiveness improved, 
exports decreased due to the global recession. It may suggest that 
Korea’s income elasticity is far greater than the price elasticity. In the 
4
th quarter, imports also recorded a growth rate of -13.0% compared to 
the previous period, reflecting the domestic recession. 
The annual real GDP grew 2.5% in 2008. However, the real GDP in 
the 4
th quarter grew by -5.6% compared to the last period; the financial 
crisis is taking a toll on the real sector. Particularly, the manufacturing 
sector recorded a growth rate of -12.0% due to decreased production in 
leading industries such as semiconductors, steel and automobiles. This 
trend spread to the construction and service sectors: private consump- 
tion and equipment investment recorded growth rates of -4.8% and 
-16.1%, respectively. 
The real GDI in the 4
th quarter which reflects the changes in terms 
of trade decreased by 2.9% slightly less than the GDP, due to fall in 
prices of natural resources. The drop in oil and raw materials prices 
due to the global recession is offsetting Korea’s decreased real purchas- 
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ing power, keeping the drop rate of GDI less than that of GDP.
In 2008, the average annual oil price was 100 dollars per barrel to 
the Korean economy’s disadvantage. If the oil price stays at about 50 
dollars per barrel, the energy costs will decrease by 24 billion dollars, 
help improve the current account and lessen the impact of the 
domestic recession.13
The fact that the global recession is added to the global imbalance is 
worrisome to a small open economy like Korea. In general, a country 
with current account deficit cannot maintain the external imbalance 
indefinitely. However, the U.S. is an exception because the dollar is the 
vehicle currency. Even though we accept the U.S. exceptionality, 
excessive current account deficit of the U.S. compared to its GDP cannot 
continue forever. Addressing the imbalance is possible by reducing 
consumption in excess of production in the U.S. This reduction will 
then dent the U.S. demand for foreign goods. However, U.S. consump- 
tion must be revitalized for the world economy to recover from the 
crisis. It is a big threat that addressing the global imbalance may stifle 
the global demand and Korean exports. 
IV. Policy Responses in Korea
Korea’s policy responses can be largely classified as supplying 
liquidity, mitigating the credit crunch, financial and corporate restruc- 
turing and economic stimulus through fiscal policies. Facing the global 
financial crisis, Korea was first focusing on addressing the credit 
crunch by supplying foreign exchange and liquidity. The financial and 
corporate restructuring has been delayed until 2009.
A. Liquidity Supply
The Korean government first focused on policies providing smooth 
supplies of the dollar and the won to prevent a further credit squeeze. 
When the exchange rate soared because of the squeeze in the foreign 
exchange market, the government promised to warrant 100 billion 
dollars for three years and provided 55 billion dollars of credit, most of 
which was trade credit. However, this warrant was ineffective as the 
credit crunch worsened worldwide and a specter of a foreign exchange 
13
It cost 86 billion dollars to import petroleum, and 38 billion dollars of 
petroleum products were exported last year. Therefore, a 50% price fall will reduce 
24 billion dollars of petroleum-related expenditures.
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crisis in Korea rose. The exchange rate continued to rise, eventually 
surpassing 1,500 won per dollar.
However, this upward pressure on the exchange rate was relieved by 
the 30 billion dollar currency swap with the U.S. The U.S. has provided 
dollars to developed countries such as Japan and European countries 
in the past to address temporary liquidity drain in international financial 
markets. This currency swap was extended to Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Singapore. Korea also established 30 billion dollar currency swaps 
respectively with Japan and China, helping stabilize the exchange rate. 
Without those swaps, the rumor that another foreign exchange crisis 
was coming in last September may have come true. In February 2009, 
the U.S. announced that it will extend the currency swap with Korea 
by additional 6 months, and this extension further helped stabilize the 
exchange rate. 
Long-term foreign financing is still hard and the short-term foreign 
debt is still around 150 billion dollars, having trouble with roll-overs. 
Thus huge inflow of capital into the bond market is unlikely for the 
time being. Thus, extending the currency swaps with Japan and China 
and increasing the amount of the swaps would be necessary. 
The movement of the exchange rate this year depends on the 
resolution of the global financial crunch, the movements of Korea’s 
current account, the trend of Korea’s economic growth and the amount 
of short-term capital drain from the market. If the current account 
records surplus and the Korean economy does not make a hard 
landing, the short-term capital drain will ease and it is not likely for 
the exchange rate to skyrocket again. When the global financial crunch 
lessens and long-term foreign exchange financing are easily available, 
the exchange rate will finally stabilize. 
To resolve domestic credit crunch, the Bank of Korea drastically 
lowered the interest rate from 5.25% to 2.5% in last September and 
increased the money supply. It also expanded purchase of government 
bonds and Currency Stabilization Bonds to supply liquidity. Since 
more than 57.3 billion dollars flew out due to balance of payments 
deficit, the central bank had to supply more credit. In addition, the 
Bank of Korea planned to provide money to Bond Market Stabilization 
Fund and lend 10 trillion won to Bank Recapitalization Fund in order 
to stabilize the bond market. However, it is neither participating in the 
financial market nor directly purchasing CDs or bank bonds yet.
The CD rate, which was around 6% due to the financial crunch, fell 
below 4% thanks to the central bank’s increased money supply. 
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However, corporate and private lending rates which are linked to the 
CD rate fell relatively less. Since banks are reluctant to lend in fear of 
insolvencies, money supply is far from smooth in the market. 
The government established the Bond Market Stabilization Fund of 
10 trillion won to support small and medium enterprises and construc- 
tion companies with liquidity problems due to the credit crunch. 5 
trillion won has already been raised. The investors include the Korea 
Development Bank (KDI), banks, insurance companies and securities 
companies. If necessary, the government will expand the funds with 
public money.
The global crisis is moving from a liquidity crisis to a credit crisis 
then to a default crisis. The liquidity crisis can be resolved by the 
central bank’s lowering the interest rate and supplying money. However, 
in case of a credit crisis, without the resolution of credit crunch the 
economy will fall into a liquidity trap in which the central bank’s 
money will come back to the origin without circulating in the market.
If the central bank’s money is not circulated because of the default 
risk of financial institutions or firms, the risk must be tackled first. 
The short-term floating money in the market was reported to be 500 
trillion won in February 2009. This shows that money are invested in 
short-term stable assets but not in long term markets despite the 
central bank’s interest rate cut to 2.5%. 
The prospect of the Korean economy is far from bright as the global 
financial crisis is spreading to the real sector. The risk of bankruptcies 
in the financial and industrial sectors is growing. In 2008 the annual 
economic growth rate was 2.5%, but the IMF expects Korea’s growth 
rate in 2009 to be -4%. If the recession continues, bankruptcies will 
increase. Only through preemptive measures to reduce the fear of 
bankruptcies will the money circulate in the market.
If the real sector’s downward spiral leads to firms’ insolvencies, the 
unrealized losses of banks will surface, possibly culminating in another 
crisis. The U.S. government is purchasing mortgage-backed securities 
and loan-backed securities (e.g., automobiles and credit cards) to ease 
the credit crunch while keeping the federal funds rate at almost 0%. In 
case the credit squeeze continues, the Bank of Korea should also 
directly purchase CDs or bank bonds to ease the credit crunch.
Also, as the government increases its expenditure, the central bank 
may have to purchase the government bonds. This is tantamount to 
financing government expenditures by printing money, and the boundary 
between the monetary and fiscal policies will be blurred. 
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B. Financial Restructuring
During the crisis in 1997, the Korean government led the financial 
restructuring and then the corporate restructuring with the financial 
institutions. At that time the insolvencies of financial institutions were 
apparent, so recapitalization and the purchase of non-performing assets 
were used together. The funds needed for restructuring was financed by 
KAMCO’s and KDIC’s bonds. Some of the funds were supplied by 
public money.
The funds from KAMCO were mostly used to purchase non-performing 
assets whereas the funds from KDIC were used for recapitalization and 
deposit payoffs. However, in the current global financial crisis, the 
insolvencies of financial institutions have not surfaced yet. Thus, the 
government is planning to first increase lending capacity and to re- 
capitalize for banks to prevent insolvencies.
As a part of the plan, the government purchased some of non- 
performing assets of construction and housing finance companies via 
KAMCO and Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC). Now, in- 
solvencies are spreading from housing to ships and automobiles. The 
possibility of small and medium enterprises’ large-scale insolvencies is 
especially worrisome.
Disposal of non-performing assets and recapitalization are the two 
sides of the same coin. Disposal of non-performing assets without 
recapitalization will bring out the downfall of financial institutions. 
Thus, the government is demanding banks to recapitalize themselves. If 
necessary, it will supply the needed capital through the Bank 
Recapitalization Fund. The banks are planning to increase BIS capital 
adequacy ratio over 12% and core capital tier 1 ratio over 9%. 
The Korean government is planning to inject government budget to 
special policy banks to increase the BIS capital adequacy ratio and 
increase lending capacity. Specifically, the government will invest 1.4 
trillion won in the KDB, 1 trillion won in the Industrial Bank of Korea 
and 950 billion won in the Korean Exim Bank to increase lending 
capacity by 40 trillion won. However, this new expanded investment is 
primarily intended to prevent possible losses of those banks. 
In addition to the banks’ efforts, the government established the 
Bank Recapitalization Fund of 20 trillion won to help banks recapitalize 
at a low financing cost. The purpose of this fund is to accumulate 
capital to prepare for a coming recession and a possible increase in 
bank losses. 
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The 20 trillion won will be composed of Bank of Korea’s loan (10 
trillion won), institutional and private investment (8 trillion won: 
purchase of ABS guaranted by Korea Credit Guarantee Fund and Kibo 
Technology Fund) and the KDB’s investment (2 trillion won: purchase 
of subordinated ABS). This fund will be used to purchase preferred 
stocks, redeemable preferred stocks, hybrid capital, subordinated bonds 
and others to help banks recapitalize. Considering that the banks’ total 
capital is 82 trillion won, if the 20 trillion won is injected to the banks, 
the commercial banks’ BIS capital adequacy ratio will increase by 2.6%. 
The government is helping the banks recapitalize by a semi-public 
fund so that money can be created and executed without the national 
assembly’s approval. If public money were created as in the past by 
KAMCO’s or KDIC’s bonds, it would require the assembly’s approval. 
However, during the crisis in 1997, the government forced write-downs 
to banks and injected capital. As a result, the relevant banks were de 
facto controlled by the government. It is understandable that except for 
Woori Bank, all banks are wary of increasing capital through the Bank 
Recapitalization Fund because they fear government intervention. They 
do not rule out the possibility that the government may still intervene 
in management even after an MOU.
The authorities are also increasing the KODIT and KIBO’s guarantee 
capacity by 11 trillion won by injecting additional 900 billion won and 
200 billion won to those two institutions, respectively. In addition, the 
government is asking KNHC to purchase mortgage loans of 7 trillion 
won to provide liquidity and also KAMCO to purchase banks’ non- 
performing loans worth 3 trillion won to improve the banks’ soundness. 
However, if the firms’ and households’ insolvencies worsen, so will 
those of financial institutions. The government will have to assess the 
size of losses objectively and to recapitalize financial institutions and 
dispose of their non-performing assets, if necessary by injecting public 
money. A review of how much public money was created and used 
during the crisis in 1997 may be worthwhile for the current financial 
restructuring. 
C. Corporate Restructuring
Even though the Bank of Korea increased money supply, banks are 
reluctant to lend money to firms in fear of insolvencies. To circulate 
money in the market and provide sufficient amount to good firms, the 
government must discern bad firms for restructuring. In this crisis, the 
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government doesn’t involve directly but asks financial institutions that 
creditors should lead the financial aid and restructuring of firms. 
Financial institutions will identify firms which are not viable and force 
them to exit the market. Creditors will also strengthen financial support 
for sound firms facing liquidity crises. 
The Creditor Adjustment Committee and the Corporate Credit Support 
Task Force headed by the governor of the Financial Supervisory Service 
are jointly responsible for providing capital and restructuring firms. 
Restructuring has been performed mostly on construction companies 
and small and medium shipbuilding companies related to project financ- 
ing. From now on the restructuring in other industries including those 
in the automobile and petrochemical industries may be discussed. 
Although it is easy to restructure bankrupt firms, it is difficult to 
restructure firms still in business. Nevertheless, since the cost of re- 
structuring increases after bankruptcies, how to conduct restructuring 
at the right moment sould be the government’s big task. Since re- 
structuring of firms surfaces previously hidden losses of financial 
institutions, corporate restructuring led by financial institutions may 
be ineffective. The government and the financial institutions must 
initiate the restructuring together, following the precedent of the 1997 
crisis. 
D. Macro Financial Regulation and Government Restructuring
Financial regulation and supervision has two dimensions: micro and 
macro dimensions. Micro dimension means regulation and supervision 
of individual financial institutions and macro one means that of the 
whole financial system and the relationship between finance and the 
whole economy.
Before the crisis in 1997, micro regulation and supervision was  
prevalent and was focused on individual financial institutions (banks, 
securities companies, insurance companies, and others). After the 
crisis, the supervision functions were integrated under the Financial 
Supervisory Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service, but 
they yet still focused on regulating the institutions on the micro 
dimension. After the onset of the global financial crisis and the crisis 
spreading to the whole financial system and the economy, the impor- 
tance of macro finance looms large. 
Two main causes of this global financial crisis are the creation and 
burst of the real estate market bubble and the collapse of the financial 
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system after excessive use of derivatives. Thus, monitoring the real 
estate market and analyzing the introduction of derivatives and its 
effect on the stability of the whole system must be enacted. This high- 
lights the importance of macro financial regulation and supervision. 
We learned that asset securitization via SIVs or SPVs without 
adequate regulation and supervision may hamper the transparency of 
the whole economy, increase the whole system’s leverage and destabilize 
the whole economy. Therefore, regulating and supervising the establish- 
ment of those companies in terms of their potential risk to the whole 
system is necessary, which is also a part of macro financial regulation 
and supervision. 
Also, since the leverage is pro-cyclical and therefore aggravates 
business cycle, a guideline for leverages related to the business cycle 
should be established. This guideline is a problem to be discussed in 
terms of macro financial supervision and regulation as well.14
For even more effective macro financial supervision and regulation, 
the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Financial Supervisory 
Service’s roles must be expanded. The Bank of Korea also needs to 
assume a more significant role, because not only does it possess 
objectives such as the stabilization of the price level and the financial 
system but also the policy instruments to achieve them. The Bank of 
Korea and the Financial Supervisory Service will have to exchange 
regulatory information through various avenues such as exchanging 
personnel.
In the global crisis, many central banks are willingly or reluctantly 
assuming the role of the lender of the last resort for banks and 
expanding direct loans to them. At times like this when such a role is 
expected of the central bank, it must also function as the macro 
financial regulator and supervisor. Moreover, the central bank has a 
comparative advantage in monitoring the real estate, stock, and 
derivatives markets with abundant human resources and a neutral 
viewpoint. A more active role will be expected of the Bank of Korea to 
stabilize the financial system and the economy as well as the price 
levels. 
The government also needs to reconsider whether they have the 
adequate structure to properly respond to economic crises. Interna- 
tional and domestic factors are intertwined behind the current financial 
14 For references of the idea of countercyclical regulation, see Adrian and 
Brunnermeiner (2009), Adrian and Shin (2008) among others. 








Worldwide 5.2 3.4 0.5 3.0
Developed Countries 2.7 1.0 -2.0 1.1
― USA 2.0 1.1 -1.6 1.6
― The Euro Region 2.6 1.0 -2.0 0.2
Germany 2.5 1.3 -2.5 0.1
France 2.2 0.8 -1.9 0.7
― Japan 2.4 -0.3 -2.6 0.6
― England 3.0 0.7 -2.8 0.2
― Other Developed 
Countries
4.6 1.9 -2.4 2.2
Emerging
Asian Countries
5.6 2.1 -3.9 3.1
Developing Countries 8.3 6.3 3.3 5.0
― China 13.0 9.0 6.7 8.0
― India 9.3 7.3 5.1 6.5
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (January 29, 2009)
crisis. Thus, assigning domestic and international financial affairs to 
two different offices will bring only confusion and complication in 
addressing the crisis. Moreover, since securitization and financial 
derivatives aggravated the financial crisis, the consistency of financial 
policies and financial regulation and supervision cannot be overrated. 
The separation of Financial Supervisory Commission from the Financial 
Supervisory Service, which split the policy decision and its imple- 
mentation, is problematic as well. But to overcome the economic crisis, 
confidence in government officials as well as an efficient organization of 
the government is also required. 
E. Economic Stimulus Package and Improving Growth Potential
The IMF lowered the forecasting of the world economic growth rate 
from 2.2% to 0.5% in January 2009 (Table 6), and expected the world 
economy to recover gradually from 2010, reaching growth rate of 3%. 
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The IMF also forecasted all developed countries and the whole Euro 
area’s growth rate to be -2.0%. Korea’s growth rate was forecasted to be 
-4.0% in 2009 and 4.2% in 2010. 
But the conventional forecasting model of economic growth cannot 
properly evaluate the impact of credit crunch and financial insolvencies 
on the economy. Thus, the IMF is constantly adjusting the forecasted 
growth rate to reflect the worsening economic conditions. 
It is clear that the economy will recover only when the credit squeeze 
disappears, the insolvencies are addressed and a radical stimulus 
package is implemented. Korea needs a drastic response because the 
impact of the global recession is profound on this small open economy. 
International organizations such as the IMF concur that stimulus 
measure of about 2% of the GDP through fiscal expansion is necessary. 
The U.S. is preparing a two-year economic stimulus package of 825 
billion dollars, which exceeds 5% of its GDP. 
Korea also needs an economic stimulus through fiscal expansion as 
consumption, investment, and exports have all decreased. Since the 
growth prospects are worsening for 2009, an economic stimulus package 
is all the more needed, even by allocating supplementary budgets.15
This fiscal expansion must be used to enlarge the Korean economy’s 
long-run growth potential as well as to stimulate domestic demand. For 
Korea to become a true developed country, the restructuring of small 
and medium enterprises and increased productivity in the service 
sector are vital. So far the restructuring of small and medium 
enterprises have been lagged compared to that of large enterprises, and 
they are having trouble competing with China. The government must 
ensure easy entry and exit while actively supporting creative and 
technology-oriented small and medium enterprises. The productivity of 
the service sector is far behind that of OECD member countries. 
Without improving this productivity, promoting growth potential is 
destined to fail. We need to lift unnecessary barriers and invest a huge 
amount of capital in finance, medical services and even education to 
improve international competitiveness in the service sector. The invest- 
ment in R&D as well as in human capital must also become more 
efficient. 
Furthermore, the investment for alternative energies must be 
increased so that energy dependence on foreign countries can be 
15 In a similar vein, Park and Lee (2009) also suggest bailouts and coun- 
tercyclical macroeconomic policies as short terms crisis management strategies. 
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reduced. The government also needs to abolish unnecessary regulations 
and enforce economic policies which promote flexibility in the labor 
market and stimulate incentives. 
During the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, Korea had only limited 
policy choices. This restriction was because of the IMF’s enforcement 
that Korea carry out contractionary monetary and fiscal policies. 
However, at that time there was a national consensus to overcome the 
economic crisis quickly and escape the IMF’s intervention. Now, we 
have much more freedom to choose policies, but many people worry 
about how strong a national consensus to overcome this crisis is. It is 
worth to note that united we can overcome this economic crisis, divided 
maybe not. 
V. Conclusion
This paper examined what has been wrong in the Korean economy, 
discerned features of the current crisis from the past one, and derived 
policy suggestions to overcome the crisis and prepare a new growth 
path. 
The current global financial crisis started in the U.S. due to many 
complex causes: abundant liquidity caused by the Fed’s low interest 
rate policy; the global imbalances mainly due to binge of American 
people; the bubble in the real estate market; greedy bankers; excessive 
leverage and moral hazard due to lax regulation and supervision; and a 
toxic relationship between the Washington and the Wall Street. Due to 
the global nature of financial transactions, the financial crisis of the 
U.S. quickly affected Europe, emerging economies, and the whole 
world. The U.S. government has responded to the crisis by providing 
liquidity, restructuring industrial and financial companies, strengthening 
regulation and supervision, and adding a huge stimulus package. A 
notable feature of the current crisis is that excessive securitization by 
financial institutions and reliance on financial derivatives made it 
difficult to assess the damages from the crisis. Also, the current global 
crisis suggests that the role of the state in the financial sector should 
increase, reversing the long trend of liberalization until now. 
The Korean economy has been more severely hit by the U.S. born 
financial crisis, compared to other countries. A main reason is that 
both the asset and liability sides of financial institutions are composed 
of those items vulnerable to market fluctuations. Increase of short term 
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foreign debt aggravated this vulnerability so as the economy to be 
sensitive to foreign exchange rate fluctuation. A new feature of the 
current crisis is that in Korea the influence of derivatives transaction 
has been much larger, as we have witnessed to the role of forward and 
KIKO in the foreign exchange market. Besides, the chronic problems of 
the real estate bubble and the dependence on exports of the economy 
also contributed to the aggravation of the crisis. 
To overcome the ongoing crisis and to revive the long term growth 
path, the paper suggested the followings: The government needs to 
provide enough liquidity so as credit crunch not to freeze the economy; 
the government and the Bank of Korea need to swiftly dispose of 
non-performing assets and recapitalize troubled financial institutions; it 
would be better for the government and financial institutions together 
to lead corporate restructuring; macro financial regulation and supervi- 
sion as well as micro one should be emphasized to reduce the risk of a 
systemic crisis; the government structure should be reorganized to 
efficiently respond to the crisis; and a drastic stimulus package needs 
to be introduced not only to stimulate the economy in recession but 
also to enlarge the long term economic growth potential. 
(Received 12 February 2009; Revised 8 June 2009)
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